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The 2005 Summer Workshop on Money, Banking, and Payments at the Cleveland
Fed covered a wide variety of topics in monetary theory and policy, banking,
and payments systems research. Topics ranged from optimal monetary policy,
optimal bank contracts, the private supply of money, the coexistence of
credit, money, and capital, the design of payment systems, and international
currencies. Effort was made to calibrate models and bring them closer to the
data. These contributions illustrate the progress made in the ﬁ  eld of
monetary theory. Here we summarize and try to tie together the papers
presented.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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Introduction
In the summer of 2005 we held the latest edition of the Summer Workshop on Money, 
Banking, and Payments at the Cleveland Fed. We covered a wide variety of topics on mon-
etary theory, banking, payment systems, and monetary policy. We saw presentations in 
which recent theoretical models are being extended in many directions to study optimal 
monetary policy with distributional effects, limited participation, and aggregate shocks. 
Additional effort has been made to calibrate these models and bring them closer to the 
data. One goal of this work is to better evaluate the welfare cost of inﬂ  ation. Other goals 
include trying to explain some particular trading arrangements (for instance, barter clubs 
in Argentina), and trying to understand some well-documented puzzles in the literature 
(such as the credit card debt puzzle).
Several contributions pursued the research agenda of introducing banks and privately 
supplied money into rigorous models of payments. Other contributions examined the 
coexistence of different assets (e.g., multiple currencies, or capital and credit in addi-
tion to money) and their implications for policy.  And others used mechanism design  to 
discuss optimal payment arrangements and to ask the question of whether net or gross 
settlement is preferable.  All these contributions illustrate the rapid progress made in the 
ﬁ  eld of monetary theory. The communication of recent developments across people ac-
tively working in the area is one of the best ways to help ensure this progress continues.
Monetary Policy
Distributional Effects 
In “Search, Market Power, and Inﬂ  ation Dynamics,” Allen Head and Beverly Lapham inves-
tigate the short-run non-neutrality of money and its implications for inﬂ  ation dynamics 
in a monetary search economy with heterogenous agents. Lump-sum money injections 
affect the distribution of money holdings in equilibrium and thus generate a short-run 
non-neutrality. The response of prices and inﬂ  ation to shocks of this type depends on in-
duced changes to households’ search intensity. Monetary shocks change the distribution 
of prices in equilibrium and, as a result, alter the returns to search. The changes in opti-
mal search intensity affect sellers’ proﬁ  t-maximizing markups. The adjustment to prices 
may be sluggish even though there are no restrictions on sellers’ ability to set prices in 
every period.
In “An Overlapping-Generations Model with Search,” Tao Zhu embeds search frictions 
in an overlapping-generations model. The result is a tractable model of monetary ex-
change that allows for distributional effects of money injections. In the model, agents 
live two periods. Young people sequentially participate in a centralized and decentralized POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 15, MARCH 2006
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market, and old agents participate only in the centralized market. These demographic 
features result in analytical tractability, since the distribution of money balances across 
the young generation is degenerate. In a series of examples, Zhu demonstrates that posi-
tive inﬂ  ation rates are Pareto optimal.
Aggregate Shocks
In Ricardo Cavalcanti and Andres Erosa’s “Price Stickiness and the Optimal Return to 
Money,” the authors formulate a Ramsey problem for the Shi-Trejos-Wright model us-
ing a recursive structure that can handle aggregate shocks. The planner is concerned 
with utility of low and high output, yl and yh, respectively, for recessions and booms. 
Individuals care about the return to money, R, in a way that implies the incentive con-
straints  yR yR lh ≤≤  and  . The value R of what money can buy is itself a function of 
future choices (yl,  yh).  When incentive constraints are ignored, the ﬁ  rst-best alloca-
tion is (yl*, yh *),  and the implied return is  R *. They then consider parameters such that 
y Ry lh * * *, << and then describe the (second-best) optimum. Output should be increased 
in recessions, above yl*, in order to increase the return R and, consequently, bring out-
put in booms closer to yh *. They show, moreover, that output should slowly converge to 
yl*  during recessions, as if price-stickiness is an endogenous business-cycle outcome. The 
price-stickiness interpretation is just one of many ways to describe the efﬁ  cient propaga-
tion of real shocks when money is working as a medium of exchange.
In an environment where money is required to facilitate trade, what effects would 
a real shock have on economic activity? And would activist government policies be 
helpful? In “Sectoral Shocks and Policy Responses in a Monetary Search Model,” Dror 
Goldberg addresses these issues. He ﬁ  nds that a real shock at a point in time can be 
propagated over time. For example, a temporary negative supply shock can reduce out-
put for a number of periods after the initial impact, after which the economy eventually 
“recovers.” An activist monetary policy of increasing the money supply can mitigate the 
negative output responses to the initial shock.
Limited Participation
In “Endogenously Segmented Asset Market in an Inventory-Theoretic Model of Money 
Demand,” Jonathan Chiu takes up a model that has recently been somewhat popular in 
monetary economics, which is based on so-called “limited participation.” Agents receive 
income, which is deposited into accounts that they are unable to use right away, and, de-
pending on where (or who) one is, access to credit markets may be restricted. Some peo-
ple have used these models to try to account for the behavior of things like exchange FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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rates or the velocity of money (see, for example, work by Alvarez, Atkeson, and a variety of 
coauthors). Chiu shows that previous results are not particularly robust. He proceeds in 
a rather natural way by allowing agents to choose when to access credit markets, where 
accessing these markets is costly. Many of the previous results in the literature, which 
exogenously restrict when agents can access markets, are overturned. Chui’s insight is a 
useful one.
In “Credit and Open Market Operations with Segmented Markets,” Stephen William-
son explores the implications of market segmentation for monetary policy. Williamson 
makes the distinction between connected households, which beneﬁ  t from the money 
injections of the central bank, and unconnected households. A connected household is 
on the receiving end of central bank actions, while an unconnected household is not. 
This segmentation, in general, produces price dispersion across markets. Price disper-
sion generates uninsured consumption risk, which is important in determining the ef-
fects of money growth and money growth shocks on the economy, as well as the opti-
mal policy. The optimal money growth rate can be very close to zero, with welfare costs 
associated with small inﬂ  ations being very large. Small money shocks can have small 
effects on aggregates but important effects across sectors, while large money shocks can 
have proportionately large effects on aggregates.
In “Avoiding the Inﬂ  ation Tax,” Huberto Ennis studies the effects of inﬂ  ation on the 
purchasing behavior of buyers in an economy where money is essential for certain trans-
actions. A long-standing intuition in this subject is that when inﬂ  ation increases, agents 
try to spend their money holdings faster. The standard framework fails to capture this 
kind of effect (e.g., Lagos and Rocheteau, 2005). Ennis proposes a simple modiﬁ  cation 
to the model in which trading of goods and rebalancing of money holdings happen less 
frequently. In such a framework, higher inﬂ  ation induces buyers to search for transac-
tions more intensively and buy goods of worse quality. The modiﬁ  cation proposed also 
sheds new light on the connection between search-theoretic and inventory-theoretic 
models of money.
Central Bank Lending 
A channel system is one where a central bank is willing to supply (lend) an arbitrary 
amount of balances to banks at a ﬁ  xed interest rate and to absorb (borrow) an arbitrary 
amount of deposits at a ﬁ  xed interest rate. In  “Optimal Monetary Policy in a Channel Sys-
tem”  Aleksander Berentsen and Cyril Monnet ﬁ  nd that it is always optimal for the central 
bank to set its lending and borrowing rates equal to one other.  The optimal monetary 
policy sets the central bank’s nominal interest rate equal to zero, i.e., the Friedman rule, POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 15, MARCH 2006
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when there is no possibility of default. However, if there is a possibility of agents default-
ing on their loans to the central bank, then the central bank will set a strictly positive in-
terest rate and, thus, the Friedman rule is no longer optimal.
Liquidity Provision 
In “Liqudity, Inﬂ  ation, and Monetary Policy,” Marcus Hagedorn develops a model of liquid-
ity where lowering nominal interest rates can be a central bank’s optimal response to a 
lower inﬂ  ation target. This response, although consistent with conventional wisdom, is 
at odds with what some monetary models (new Keynesian models) might imply. In a re-
peated Diamond and Dybvig economy, there is uncertainty about the need for liquidity 
in every period. A ﬁ  nancial intermediation sector provides liquidity (or money) to those 
agents who urgently need it and invests and saves for those who do not. The theoretical 
part of the paper shows that inﬂ  ation can decrease in response to an increase in nominal 
interest rates. A lower inﬂ  ation target then requires a higher nominal interest rate.  The 
quantitative part of the paper demonstrates that the model ﬁ  ts the data well despite be-
ing parsimoniously parameterized.  Hagedorn then uses the calibrated model to assess 
whether the above stated conventional wisdom is justiﬁ  ed. The following result is ob-
tained: Inﬂ  ation is decreasing in nominal interest rates if nominal interest rates are low 
(i.e., when the market is “liquid”) and increasing if nominal interest rates are high (i.e., 
when the market is “illiquid”).
Inside Money and Banking
Banking
In a model where money is essential, Aleksander Berensten and Christopher Waller in-
troduce commercial banks and a central bank. In their paper “Optimal Stabilization Pol-
icy with Flexible Prices,” all agents hold positive money balances before entering the 
decentralized market, where money is required for trade. Before entering the decentral-
ized market, agents learn whether they will be buyers or sellers; sellers hold “too much” 
money and buyers “too little” in the decentralized market. Although a commercial bank 
is helpful in reallocating money balances from sellers to buyers, if governments are un-
able to tax agents, a central bank can improve the distribution of money holdings, and 
hence welfare, by offering money loans in the decentralized market, which are repayable 
before the next decentralized market opens. The central-bank loans resemble repurchase 
and sale agreements.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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In a ﬁ  nite environment, inside money—which is a claim on future stochastic out-
put—may be required to facilitate exchange. If (stochastic) output is not costlessly ob-
servable to all agents, then monitoring may be required. It has been shown, in an envi-
ronment with no aggregate uncertainty, that it is optimal to have the agent who issues 
the inside money also do the monitoring. In “Aggregate Uncertainty, Money,and Banking,” 
Hongfei Sun relaxes the no-aggregate-uncertainty assumption and ﬁ  nds that a money 
and banking arrangement, i.e., where the agent who issues the inside money also does 
the monitoring, dominates an arrangement where issuer of the inside money and the 
monitor are different agents.
The optimal deposit contracts in models of banking in the tradition of Diamond and 
Dybvig are extremely complicated and do not at all resemble the kind of deposit con-
tracts that banks offer in reality. For example, an optimal deposit contract in the models 
will be a function of how many people before the current depositor did and did not 
want to make withdrawal, and the order in which the withdrawals are made. In practice, 
the amount that a depositor withdraws is independent of the withdrawal history of pre-
vious depositors, unless, of course, the bank is under ﬁ  nancial distress. In “Moral Hazard 
and the Design of Bank Liabilities,” David Andolfatto and Ed Nosal suppose that the bank 
is run by an agent whose object is to maximize his own well-being, as opposed to a 
planner, whose objective is to maximize social welfare. They ﬁ  nd that when reasonable 
restrictions are imposed on what can and cannot be veriﬁ  ed, and when veriﬁ  cation may 
be costly, the optimal bank contract becomes much simpler. When veriﬁ  cation is costly, 
the optimal bank contract resembles what we observe in reality.
Private Supply of Money
In practice, issuers of inside money tend to be regulated. One popular regulation is that 
issuers of inside money are required to redeem on demand and at par. Is there any jus-
tiﬁ  cation for such a regulation? In “Imperfect Monitoring and the Discounting of Inside 
Money,” David Mills ﬁ  nds that such a regulation can actually lower welfare. In an unregu-
lated environment, a lower quality inside money would be discounted by agents in the 
economy. A par redemption requirement lowers the value of all inside money to that of 
the lowest quality in the economy. This result is somewhat reminiscent of Gresham’s Law, 
which says that bad money drives out good money.POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 15, MARCH 2006
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In “Time Consistency of the Private Provision of Fiat Money,” Luis Araujo and Braz 
Camargo study whether private money is viable in the absence of any external control 
in an economy that is characterized by decentralized trade and information. The bank, 
which is a self-interested agent, has a monopoly over the provision of ﬁ  at money and 
is not restricted in how much money it can issue over time. If the bank can commit to 
a choice of money supply, then a monetary equilibrium with no overissue of money 
exists. This equilibrium, however, is not time-consistent; the equilibrium does not sur-
vive when it is not possible for the bank to commit. Araujo and Camargo show that all 
monetary equilibria will be characterized by overissue in each period when the bank is 
unable to commit.
In “A Model of Banknote Discounts” Laurence Ales, Francesca Carapella, Pricila Mazie-
ro, and Warren Weber construct a model that builds on Trejos and Wright, and Cavalcanti 
and Wallace, and attempts to explain the following stylized facts regarding banknotes 
during the 1820–1860 period: (i) local banknotes were always quoted at par to one 
another; (ii) “foreign” banknotes were typically quoted at a discount to local banknotes 
and varied by location; (iii) the discount on “foreign” notes ﬂ  uctuated over time; (iv) 
the discounts were asymmetric across locations; (v) discounts on “foreign” notes were 
higher when those notes were not being redeemed at par, which was $1 of silver for a 
$1 note; and (vi) local banknotes were quoted at a discount to specie when local banks 
suspended payments on their notes.
Mariana Colacelli presents an empirical analysis of basic microfounded models of 
money in “Secondary Currency: An Empirical Analysis.” She collected her own survey 
data from “barter clubs” in Argentina. Barter clubs are privately organized markets that 
issue their own currencies. Theory predicts that people are more likely to use these pri-
vate monies when several things are true, such as, there is a shortage of ofﬁ  cial currency 
and private monies are well managed (e.g., they are difﬁ  cult to counterfeit). She runs 
several empirical tests and ﬁ  nds that, by and large, the predictions of the model are well 
supported by the data. She then calculates the welfare gains to individuals from using 
private monies.
Money and Credit
In “On the Complementarity of Money and Credit” Leo Ferraris constructs a model where 
both money and credit are used in exchange. Money is costly to hold but is needed for 
the usual double-coincidence-of-wants problem; credit can be used to augment purchas-
es. Money and credit can simultaneously exist because agents must post collateral to FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
7
issue credit. Credit is ultimately repaid with money and repayment takes time. Speciﬁ  -
cally, agents with outstanding credit have to work in the future to obtain money, which 
can be used to pay off debt; a clearinghouse would obviate the need to settle debt with 
money. In this model an anticipated inﬂ  ation has some negative consequences. Inﬂ  ation 
increases the cost of holding a promise to future money (credit) more than the oppor-
tunity cost of holding money itself. Hence, inﬂ  ation reduces credit and, thereby, also re-
duces output.
Irina Telyukova and Randall Wright present an analysis of the interaction between 
money and consumer debt in “A Model of Money and Credit, with Application to the 
Credit Card Debt Puzzle.” They document that many individuals in the United States 
simultaneously have signiﬁ  cant credit card debt and money in the bank. The so-called 
“credit card debt puzzle” is that given high interest rates on credit cards and low interest 
rates on bank accounts, why do people not pay down this debt? Some economists go to 
elaborate lengths to explain this behavior. As an alternative, Telyukova and Wright pres-
ent a simple and natural extension of a standard model in monetary theory to incorpo-
rate consumer debt—which is interesting in its own right—and which shows that the 
coexistence of debt and money in the bank is not puzzle. Consumers simply do not want 
to use their liquid assets to pay down their debt because they value liquidity.
In “Gross Loan Flows,” Ben Craig and Joseph Haubrich apply the methodology of 
Davis and Haltiwanger to study gross loan ﬂ  ows at the level of banks. They show that 
changes in net lending hide much larger and more variable gross lending ﬂ  ows. They 
present a series of stylized facts about gross loan ﬂ  ows and the way they vary over time, 
bank size, and the business cycle. They relate these observations to the ﬂ  ow of job cre-
ation and destruction in the labor market. Also, they show how their results relate to the 
predictions of a simple search model of the credit market along the lines of Wasmer and 
Weil (2003).
Assets and Liquidity
S. Boragan Aruoba, Christopher Waller, and Randall Wright in “Money and Capital,” con-
tinue their work on the integration of modern monetary theory with mainstream macro-
economics along several dimensions. In particular, they study a numerical version of the 
Lagos-Wright monetary model, extended to include capital as a productive input. Com-
pared to earlier models with money and capital, this one has rich feedback across mar-
kets, and monetary policy has interesting implications for investment, consumption, and 
employment. The paper calibrates the model and uses it to study quantitatively the effects POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 15, MARCH 2006
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of monetary and ﬁ  scal policy. The authors do not simply make comparisons across steady 
states, rather, they take dynamic transitions into account. They ﬁ  nd, for example, that the 
cost of 10 percent inﬂ  ation, versus constant prices, can be between 1 percent and 5 per-
cent of consumption, depending on the precise details of the model economy.
In “Asset Prices and Liquidity in an Exchange Economy,” Ricardo Lagos extends a 
search model of monetary exchange to include real assets. Financial assets are valued 
for their liquidity, the extent to which they are useful in facilitating exchange, as well as 
for being claims to streams of future consumption goods. The implications for average 
asset returns, the equity premium puzzle, and the risk-free rate puzzle are explored both 
analytically and quantitatively in a version of the model that nests the standard frame-
work of Mehra and Prescott (1985).
In “A Search-Based Theory of the On-the-Run Phenomenon,” Dimitri Vayanos and 
Pierre-Olivier Weill propose a model in which assets with identical cash ﬂ  ows can trade 
at different prices. This is sometimes referred to as the “on-the-run phenomenon.” Agents 
can establish long or short positions in assets, and both the spot and the asset-lending 
markets are subject to search frictions. Short-sellers will concentrate in one asset be-
cause of thick-market externalities. As a result, that asset enjoys both greater liquidity, as 
measured by search times, and a higher lending fee or “specialness.” Liquidity and spe-
cialness translate into price premia that are consistent with no-arbitrage.
Raphael Silviera and Randall Wright, in “Liquidity and the Market for Ideas,” study mar-
kets where innovators sell ideas to entrepreneurs, who may be better at implementing 
them. The markets for ideas are decentralized, with random matching and bilateral bar-
gaining. Entrepreneurs hold liquid assets, such as cash, lest potentially proﬁ  table oppor-
tunities are lost. The paper extends search-based models of the demand for money along 
several dimensions, including allowing agents with insufﬁ  cient money to put deals on 
hold while they try to raise the funds. Given liquidity costs, i.e., interest rates, the equi-
librium level of ideas traded is compared to the efﬁ  cient outcome. The optimal response 
of monetary policy is discussed.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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Payment Systems
What features might an optimal payment system embody when exchange between 
agents may be subject to informational asymmetries and imperfect monitoring? Thor-
sten Koeppl, Cyril Monnet, and Ted Temzelides address this question in “Transactions 
and Mechanism Design.” One can think of liquidity as short-term borrowing. In provid-
ing liquidity through a payment system, there will be a trade-off between efﬁ  ciency and 
incentives to tell the truth. Speciﬁ  cally, although additional liquidity may lead to better 
trading outcomes, it will also impair the incentives for agents to tell the truth. If the pay-
ment system limits the amount of liquidity available to agents by placing caps on short-
term borrowing, then the ﬁ  rst-best allocation will not be supportable. If, however, agents 
are allowed to trade for several rounds before accounts are settled at a centralized place, 
then the ﬁ  rst-best allocation is supportable if settlement takes place with a sufﬁ  ciently 
high frequency.
In “A Model of Interbank Settlement,” Ben Lester analyzes a model of the payment sys-
tem where banks are modeled explicitly, and in a rather novel way. As in the real world, 
banks need to make payments in the model throughout the day or, perhaps, at the end 
of the day, depending on the system that is in place to settle accounts between banks. 
Lester ﬁ  rst studies a partial equilibrium model, where he can investigate the effects on 
the banking system of changing some variables and can compare the operating charac-
teristics of real-time gross settlement and net settlement systems. He then embeds the 
partial model into a general equilibrium structure to analyze the impact that policy and 
other variables will have on, for example, the loan market and interest rates.
Recent models of monetary exchange and payments have ruled out credit arrange-
ments by appealing to the notion of anonymity in bilateral trades. In “A Random Match-
ing Theory,” C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera, and Daniela Puzzello develop a theory 
that makes the notion of anonymity more explicit and rigorous. They consider different 
notions of anonymity (weak and strong) and identify which one is satisﬁ  ed in standard 
models of money. For instance, one notion of anonymity requires that two individuals 
have not shared a common trading partner in the past. Monetary models have adopted 
a notion of weak anonymity in which agents only match for one period and never meet 
again. While it has been claimed in the monetary literature that this weaker notion of 
anonymity rules out bilateral credit, it does not imply that stronger notions of anonymity 
may open the door to more elaborate trading arrangements.POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 15, MARCH 2006
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Multiple Currencies
In “A Theory of International Currency and Seigniorage Competition,” Yiting Li and Aki-
hiko Matsui study currency competition and its effects on the circulation of currencies 
and welfare. They show that a country’s inﬂ  ationary policy has a negative impact on the 
circulation of its currency. This effect imposes a discipline on countries and, the more 
open is a country, the stronger is the discipline. The worldwide circulation of a currency 
increases seigniorage and welfare of the issuing country and decreases its inﬂ  ation rate. 
The country whose currency is not used as an international currency will raise its inﬂ  a-
tion rate. The authors show, however, that there is a limit on the inﬂ  ation rate, beyond 
which the country cannot maintain the circulation of national money.
Liu Qing and Shouyong Shi study a model with two countries and two currencies in 
“Currency Areas and Monetary Coordination.” Unlike most models in the literature, they 
do not impose “cash-in-advance” constraints on the two countries which force people 
to use a particular money to buy a particular good. In the model, this outcome is (more 
or less) endogenous. The model structure is used to ask how monetary policy affects 
the domestic economy and how it spills over to the foreign economy. The paper stresses 
that the results can depend on whether monetary policies are set independently across 
the countries or whether there is some coordination between countries.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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Papers at the 2005 Summer Workshop on Money, Banking, and Payments 
(presenters in italic)
Session I: August 8–12, 2005
Session II: August 15–19, 2005
  Session
Monetary Policy
Search, Market Power, and Inﬂ  ation Dynamics  II
Allen Head and Beverly Lapham (Queen’s University)
An Overlapping Generations Model with Search  I
Tao Zhu (Cornell University)
Price Stickiness and the Optimal Return to Money  II
Ricardo Cavalcanti (Getulio Vargas Foundation) and Andres Erosa (University of Toronto)
Sectoral Shocks and Policy Responses in a Monetary Search Model  I
Dror Goldberg (Texas A&M University)
Endogenously Segmented Asset Market in an Inventory-Theoretic Model 
of Money Demand  II
Jonathan Chiu (University of Western Ontario)
Credit and Open Market Operations with Segmented Markets  II
Stephen Williamson (University of Iowa)
Avoiding the Inﬂ  ation Tax  I
Huberto Ennis (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond)
Optimal Monetary Policy in a Channel System  II
Cyril Monnet (European Central Bank) and Aleksander Berentsen (University of Basel)
Liquidity, Inﬂ  ation, and Monetary Policy  II
Marcus Hagedorn (University of Frankfurt)
Assets and Liquidity
Money and Capital  I
Boragan Aruoba (University of Maryland), Christopher Waller (University of Notre Dame), 
and Randall Wright (University of Pennsylvania)
Asset Prices and Liquidity in an Exchange Economy  I
Ricardo Lagos (New York University)
A Search-Based Theory of the On-the-Run Phenomenon   II
Pierre-Olivier Weill (New York University) and Dimitri Vayanos (London School of Economics)
Liquidity and the Market for  Ideas   I
Rafael Silveira (University of Pennsylvania) and Randall Wright (University of Pennsylvania)POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 15, MARCH 2006
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  Session
Inside Money and Banking 
Optimal Stabilization Policy with Flexible Prices  I
Aleksander Berensten (University of Basel) and Christopher Waller (University of Notre Dame)
Aggregate Uncertainty, Money, and Banking  I
Hongfei Sun (University of Toronto)
Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Bank Runs  II
David Andolfatto (Simon Fraser University) and Ed Nosal (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland)
Imperfect Monitoring and the Discounting of Inside Money  I
David Mills (Board of Governors)
Time Consistency of the Private Provision of Fiat Money  II
Luis Araujo (Michigan State University) and Braz Camargo (University of Western Ontario)
A Model of Banknote Discounts  I
Laurence Ales, Francesca Carapella, Pricila Maziero, and Warren Weber 
(Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis)
Secondary Currency: An Empirical Analysis  II
Mariana Colacelli (Harvard University)
On the Complementarity of Money and Credit    II
Leo Ferraris (London School of Economics)
A Model of Money and Credit, with an Application to the Credit Card Debt Puzzle  II
Irina Telyukova and Randall Wright (University of Pennsylvania)
Gross Loan Flows  II
Ben Craig and Joseph G. Haubrich (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland) 
Payment Systems
Transactions and Mechanism Design  II
Thorsten Koeppl (Queen’s University), Cyril Monnet (European Central Bank), and 
Ted Temzelides (University of Pittsburg)
A Model of Interbank Settlement  I
Ben Lester (University of Pennsylvania)
A Random Matching Theory  I
C.D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera, and Daniela Puzzello (Purdue University)
Multiple Currencies
A Theory of International Currency and Seigniorage Competition  I
Yiting Li (National Taiwan University) and Akihiko Matsui
Currency Areas and Monetary Coordination   I
Liu Qing and Shouyong Shi (University of Toronto) 